The Last Will Be First: Water Transfers from Agriculture to Cities in the Pangani River Basin, Tanzania by Barbara Koppen et al.
www.water-alternatives.org   Volume 5 | Issue 3 
Komakech, H.C.; van der Zaag, P. and van Koppen, B. 2012.  
The last will be first: Water transfers from agriculture to  
cities in the Pangani river basin, Tanzania. 
Water Alternatives 5(3): 700-720 
Komakech et al.: Water transfers in the Pangani river basin, Tanzania Page | 700 
 
The Last Will Be First: Water Transfers from Agriculture to Cities 
in the Pangani River Basin, Tanzania 
Hans C. Komakech 
Nelson Mandela African Institute of Science and Technology, Arusha, Tanzania; UNESCO-IHE, Delft, the 
Netherlands; Department of Water Resources, Delft University of Technology, Delft, the Netherlands; 
h.komakech@unesco-ihe.org 
Pieter van der Zaag 
UNESCO-IHE, Delft, the Netherlands; Department of Water Resources, Delft University of Technology, Delft, the 
Netherlands; p.vanderzaag@unesco-ihe.org 
Barbara van Koppen 
International Water Management Institute (IWMI), Southern Africa Regional Program, Pretoria, South Africa; 
b.vankoppen@cgiar.org 
ABSTRACT: Water transfers to growing cities in sub-Sahara Africa, as elsewhere, seem inevitable. But absolute 
water entitlements in basins with variable supply may seriously affect many water users in times of water scarcity. 
This paper is based on research conducted in the Pangani river basin, Tanzania. Using a framework drawing from a 
theory of water right administration and transfer, the paper describes and analyses the appropriation of water 
from smallholder irrigators by cities. Here, farmers have over time created flexible allocation rules that are 
negotiated on a seasonal basis. More recently the basin water authority has been issuing formal water use rights 
that are based on average water availability. But actual flows are more often than not less than average. The 
issuing of state-based water use rights has been motivated on grounds of achieving economic efficiency and social 
equity. The emerging water conflicts between farmers and cities described in this paper have been driven by the 
fact that domestic use by city residents has, by law, priority over other types of use. The two cities described in 
this paper take the lion’s share of the available water during the low-flow season, and at times over and above the 
permitted amounts, creating extreme water stress among the farmers. Rural communities try to defend their 
prior use claims through involving local leaders, prominent politicians and district and regional commissioners. 
Power inequality between the different actors (city authorities, basin water office, and smallholder farmers) 
played a critical role in the reallocation and hence the dynamics of water conflict. The paper proposes 
proportional allocation, whereby permitted abstractions are reduced in proportion to the expected shortfall in 
river flow, as an alternative by which limited water resources can be fairly allocated. The exact amounts (quantity 
or duration of use) by which individual user allocations are reduced would be negotiated by the users at the river 
level. 
 
KEYWORDS: Inter-sectoral allocation, irrigation, priority allocation, urban water demand, water conflict, water 
right, water scarcity 
INTRODUCTION 
Urban centres are steadily growing and need more and more water. Transferring water from agriculture 
to cities is an obvious way of reallocating the uses and users of the available water in a catchment (Celio 
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et al., 2010). The main rationale is that in situations of water scarcity allocation should favour uses with 
the highest returns per unit of water (including basic human needs). In this discourse, agriculture is 
considered as a voracious user of water that mainly produces low-value output (Savenije and van der 
Zaag, 2002; Molle and Berkoff, 2006). In cases where the level of water development has reached its 
maximum and/or inter-sectoral reallocations do not suffice, interbasin transfers seem to be the 
preferred (supply-oriented) strategy (see Swyngedouw, 1997 on urbanisation of water; for an 
assessment of interbasin water transfers see Gupta and van der Zaag, 2008). Little attention is being 
paid to the fact that irrigation water may serve many other high-values uses (e.g. domestic, vegetable 
gardens, livestock, fishing, and construction). 
In Tanzania, the ongoing state-led formalisation of water allocation may be considered a 
continuation of a process started by the British colonial power. As early as 1923, the British colonial 
administrators introduced a statutory water right system in mainland Tanzania (then Tanganyika), 
whereby the ownership of all water resources was vested in the King of England. Water rights were 
issued to users located in areas declared crown land, while areas under 'natives' were allowed to be 
governed by local customs and traditions. 
Although the independent government of Tanzania was at first preoccupied with modernisation 
through irrigation development and the reorganisation of villages, it subsequently amended the 
colonial water law and policies, introducing water rights fees and volumetric charges for water used. 
The most recent attempt by the government to regulate water use is driven by increased scarcity, 
which among others is manifested by frequent electricity power cuts (Lankford et al., 2009). Nearly all 
Tanzania hydroelectric power plants are located downstream of other users and are, hence, very 
sensitive to water scarcity. Water shortages are attributed to uncoordinated planning of use, imperfect 
policies, inefficient use in the agricultural areas, and inadequate monitoring (World Bank, 1996). To 
solve this problem the water policies and laws were revised in 2002 and 2009, respectively. The 
National Water Policy of 2002 gives first priority to water for basic human needs (often interpreted as 
water for drinking only, not considering other domestic needs), second priority is given to water 
required to protect ecosystems, while all other uses are subject to social and economic criteria to be 
reviewed from time to time (URT, 2002). The policy recognises that "water is a public good of high value 
in all its competing uses, and requires careful conservation and sustainable utilization" (URT, 2002). It 
cites extensive irrigation during dry seasons and inefficiencies of many irrigation schemes as major 
causes for reduction in water availability (URT, 2002). This position is in line with generally held views 
that: (a) agriculture gets the lion’s share of all water diverted and yet generates low returns per unit 
water used; (b) agriculture incurs the largest wastage; (c) water productivity in the non-agriculture 
sector is much higher than in agriculture; and (d) cities are frequently water-short (Molle and Berkoff, 
2009; Rosegrant et al., 2009). Thus it is believed that considerable gains can be achieved by improving 
irrigation efficiencies and, if that is not sufficient, through reallocating water to higher-value uses (Molle 
and Berkoff, 2009). In the Pangani basin irrigated agriculture is mainly practised by smallholder farmers. 
It is believed that these farmers utilise most of the available water but with very low efficiencies leading 
to water stress (Maganga et al., 2002; Kashaigili et al., 2003). 
Implementation of the 2002 water policy, however, appears to generate conflicts in water allocation 
at the local level. Thirsty cities within a river basin refer to the water act, which gives priority to 
domestic needs, to claim water already in use by rural communities for small-scale irrigated agriculture. 
This leads to tensions and sometimes violent confrontations. This paper describes and analyses 
processes of water appropriation from smallholder irrigators by cities in the Pangani river basin and the 
ensuing conflicts. Using a framework of agriculture-to-city water transfers, it identifies shortcomings in 
the current water allocation system and proposes an alternative allocation mechanism that takes into 
account the variability in supply and also proposes alternative institutional arrangements for its 
enforcement. 
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The following section reviews the concept of water allocation focusing on water right administration 
and transfer and highlights the typology of transfer and mechanisms often used. Section 3 introduces 
the study area (Pangani river basin and study sites) and the research methods used. Section 4 presents 
two cases of city versus smallholder farmers’ water allocation conflict. The next section (5) discusses 
the findings and by way of conclusion (section 6) the paper explores mechanisms by which limited 
water resources can be fairly allocated between cities and rural areas. 
CONCEPTUAL REVIEW: WATER TRANSFER BETWEEN AGRICULTURAL AND URBAN USE 
When water is scarce it has to be shared among competing interests and this requires putting in place 
criteria and procedures that clearly define who is entitled to what amount of water, at what time, for 
how long and in which place. In addition, proper institutional arrangements with means to monitor the 
enforcement of the water-related rules are required. Although the arrangement can also be developed 
by users, religious communities, non-governmental organisations and customary leaders, normally 
governments assume the role of the main regulator of water use in a catchment. State-led water 
management reforms have included the formalisation of water right1 administration and the creation of 
basin management institutions. Water ownership is vested in the state and users are required to 
acquire permits to use water from a given source. These approaches are used to justify government’s 
intervention in water allocation in terms of economic efficiency, social equity and sustainability of the 
water resource (Syme et al., 1999; Wang et al., 2003). These three principles, coupled with the notion 
of users’ participation in the decision-making process, are integral components of the discourse on 
Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM). 
In places where water is over-allocated, reallocation and transfers between uses or sectors are the 
typical responses (other responses may include reuse of treated wastewater, improvement of irrigation 
efficiency, etc). The process of water transfers from agriculture to cities takes several forms and may 
include: temporary transfer; permanent but gradual transfer; and permanent and outright transfer 
(figure 1). Temporary transfers typically occur during periods of drought; the agriculture sector will be 
severely affected albeit for a limited period of time. The most quoted example of temporary water 
transfer is the California Drought Water Bank which arranges temporary water purchases from 
individual farmers for transfer to other users (Molle and Berkoff, 2006; Meinzen-Dick and Ringler, 2008). 
Permanent but gradual transfer is a case where a water source is progressively diverted to the city. 
Initially a limited quantity may be diverted, which diffuses its effect in the short term. Permanent and 
outright transfer, on the other hand, is a sudden and long-term reallocation; large transfers are often 
contested by the existing users. 
To understand the impacts of transfer it is interesting to follow the mechanism (formal or informal) 
by which the three types of water transfer are implemented. Four mechanisms of transfers can be 
identified (Meinzen-Dick and Ringler, 2008; Molle and Berkoff, 2009). First, market-based mechanisms 
allow water to be sold either directly to buyers for non-agricultural uses or indirectly through transfers 
of land with a water right appurtenant to it. Second, water right transfer through administrative 
decisions follows a formal procedure which is spearheaded by a national government or basin 
management institution according to the functions assigned by law. Celio et al. (2010) highlight how 
water transfers from the Krishna and Manjira rivers to the city of Hyderabad in India were sanctioned 
through several government orders. Prior use rights are rarely recognised although indirect 
compensation may be given (Meinzen-Dick and Ringler, 2008). Farmers may protest against 
administrative transfers but are mostly unsuccessful against cities that appear to be more powerful. 
Third, transfer through collective negotiations with communities can be concluded between existing 
                                                          
1
 In this paper, a water use right and a water permit have the same meaning – both confer a time-bound right to beneficial use 
of the available water but not its ownership. 
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users and the state or between the users themselves. Collective negotiations aim at win-win solutions 
and may take into account other uses (Molle, 2004). Fourth, transfer by stealth is done unilaterally by 
the state, basin authority or other entity, without complying with formal procedures and/or legal 
requirements, and without consulting those potentially affected. 
Figure 1. Typology of water transfer. 
 
Source: Adapted from Molle and Berkoff, 2006; Meinzen-Dick and Ringler, 2008. 
Although widely promoted, available literature on water transfers indicates that they often have 
negative impacts on irrigators, other uses linked to irrigation water, and the environment (Hearne, 2007; 
Molle and Berkoff, 2009; Celio et al., 2010; Movik, 2012; Perramond, 2012). Meinzen-Dick and Ringler 
(2008) present a case where water-exporting regions in California lost more in crop production than 
they were paid for the water. Market-based transfers, e.g. water sales by tankers’ association from 
rural to middle-class residents, have been reported (Meinzen-Dick and Ringler, 2008), but water 
markets at larger spatial scales have been less frequent and often unsuccessful, partly because of the 
infrastructure needed to transfer water from one user to another (Molle and Berkoff, 2009). So far, 
positive experiences of market-based transfers are confined to countries with strong legal, institutional 
and regulatory backgrounds and relatively wealthy stakeholders (Hearne, 2007; Molle and Berkoff, 
2009). Thus in countries characterised by data scarcity, where the requisite physical infrastructure for 
water control (e.g. storage reservoirs, canals) is lacking, and with weak monitoring and enforcement 
capacity, water transfers by market-based mechanisms are likely to be problematic. 
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Finally, in most African countries state law is not the only source of water rights but there are also 
customary rules backed by local authority and social norms that govern water access. Religious laws 
and development projects also define the condition for access to water. Hence, users may use different 
rules and rights to claim water access (Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan, 2002). The plurality of water laws 
may be a source of conflict when dealing with water reallocation. 
STUDY AREA AND RESEARCH METHODS 
Study area: Pangani river basin and location of research catchment 
The Pangani river basin is one of the nine basins in mainland Tanzania. It covers a land area of 
approximately 43,650 km2, 5% of which is in Kenya. The headwaters of the basin are located on the 
slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro and Mount Meru, with Kikuletwa and Ruvu rivers being the major 
tributaries of the Pangani river. This paper focuses on the Kikuletwa tributary (figure 2). The Pangani 
river passes through arid Maasai steppe, draining the Pare and Usambara mountain ranges (Mkomazi 
and Luengera tributaries, respectively) before reaching the estuary and the Indian Ocean. The basin 
covers all or part of four administrative regions of Arusha, Kilimanjaro, Manyara and Tanga. In total 14 
districts and two major municipalities (Arusha and Moshi) rely on the water resources of the basin. 
The current population in the basin is estimated at 3.7 million (IUCN Eastern and Southern Africa 
Programme, 2009). The basin’s population on the Tanzania side is influenced by in-migration of people 
in search of land and business opportunities (Mbonile, 2005). About 80% of the population depends 
directly or indirectly on agriculture for their livelihoods. Local farmers in the highland areas (e.g. 
Kilimanjaro and Meru highlands) have practised canal irrigation for more than 200 years, and currently 
there are over 3400 known water users but the actual number is likely to be much higher (Komakech et 
al., 2011). Intensive canal irrigation in the highlands compensate for the small farmland sizes (about 0.6 
ha per household), while in the lowlands where agricultural land is abundant (about 10.4 ha per 
household) irrigation buffers against climate vagaries (IUCN Eastern and Southern Africa Programme, 
2009). 
The two cities of Arusha and Moshi are located in the upper part of the basin (figure 2). The 
development in these urban areas is partly driven by their location in regions with productive 
agriculture, mining activities and a booming tourism industry. In 1977, both cities had about 50,000 
residents each. In 2010 number of residents of Moshi and Arusha had increased to 156,000 and 
367,000, respectively. This growth puts significant pressure on the basin’s limited water resources in 
terms of water for domestic, commercial and industrial uses and crop production. 
The fast expansion of irrigated areas and increased cropping intensities, rapid urbanisation and an 
increased demand for water from cities, combined with climate variability have resulted in many 
tributaries of the Pangani river now only flowing in parts of the year, i.e. during the rainy seasons (Mul 
et al., 2009). The basin is therefore experiencing stiff competition and conflict over its water resources. 
Conflicts between city water authorities and smallholder irrigated agriculture; between farmers and 
hydropower facilities located downstream; and between large commercial farmers and small-scale 
irrigators are all increasing in both scale and frequency (Komakech et al., 2011). 
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Figure 2. Pangani river basin, reservoir, lakes, cities, towns and Kikuletwa case study catchment. 
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Research material and methods 
To understand the implication of urban water appropriation on smallholder farmers we studied the 
historical processes through which water transfers had taken place. Field studies were conducted 
(January to March 2009 and February to June 2010) on two cases of long-standing water conflicts 
between smallholder farmers and cities competing for water in the basin. The case studies are Shiri 
Njoro spring and the Nduruma river both located in the Kikuletwa catchment. The study involved 
interviews, and discussions with furrow (locally constructed irrigation canals) and river committees,2 
village leaders, farmers, city water authorities (technical manager), and staff of the Pangani Basin Water 
Office (PBWO). In Shiri Njoro spring we conducted group interviews with the chairmen and secretaries 
of three irrigation canals (total six members), and leaders of Shiri Njoro village irrigation canals 
association (total three members). We interviewed a representative of Moshi Urban Water Authority 
(the technical manager). The interviews focused on understanding the development of water use, the 
evolution of conflicts in the area and the strategies followed by the different users. Further 
downstream of Shiri Njoro spring, we interviewed five out of the seven irrigation committees (in total 
ten members, two from each furrow) and leaders of the overarching Kiladeda river committee 
(chairman and secretary). Shiri Njoro spring is one of the sources of the Kiladeda river. 
In Nduruma, we conducted group interviews with village furrow committees of Bangata, Nduruma, 
Moivaro, and Midawe villages (total 28 members). We interviewed the representatives of commercial 
estates located in the mid-section of Nduruma sub-catchment: Old River Farm; former owner of Gomba 
Estate; manager of Dekker Bruins; the director and the irrigation manager of Arusha Blooms; and the 
environmental and fertigation3 officers of Kiliflora. We conducted a group interview with the leaders of 
Nduruma river committees (chairman and secretary) who were asked about their role in water 
allocation and management and how they relate with the Pangani Basin Water Board (PBWB). 
To get a broader understanding of the administration of water rights we interviewed Meru and Hai 
district irrigation officers, the officer at the PBWO, the Nduruma ward executive officer and the Sokon II 
ward office chairman. 
The study also benefited from unpublished sources. For the Shiri spring we reviewed letters, minutes 
of past meetings and reports compiled by the farmers, while for the Nduruma conflict secondary 
materials reviewed were mainly from Pamoja Trust (a local NGO based in Moshi) and PBWO archives. 
We also consulted relevant government documents, policies, water acts, and media reports on the 
water conflicts. 
PANGANI WATER CONFLICT: CITY VERSUS SMALLHOLDER AGRICULTURE 
In this section we present the water conflicts between the city of Arusha and Moshi and their rural 
neighbourhoods (Shiri Njoro and Nduruma). Currently water and sewerage services within the 
municipality of Arusha and Moshi are provided by fully autonomous public entities (Arusha Urban 
Water Supply Authority and Moshi Urban Water Supply Authority). Arusha city abstracts about 39,500 
m3/day, and Moshi about 24,000 m3/day (EWURA, 2010). However 26 and 32% of the abstracted water 
for Arusha and Moshi, respectively, is non-revenue water. To meet the demand of their growing 
population these cities increasingly appropriate water from sources already used by smallholder 
farmers. 
                                                          
2
 River committees are water management structures created by the users to allocate and solve water conflict between users 
of a common river source (Komakech and Van der Zaag, 2011). 
3
 Fertigation is the application of chemical fertiliser and other products through an irrigation system. 
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Before presenting the two case studies, we first provide a historical overview of the water rights 
administration in the Pangani river basin and in Tanzania as a whole (for more details, see Komakech et 
al., 2011, 2012a). 
Historical context of water right development 
The government’s initial attempt to regulate water use by issuing water rights in the Pangani basin 
started during the colonial times. The colonial administration’s intervention in water allocation in 
Tanzania as a whole was not about ensuring equity and sustainability of the water resources. Rather it 
was to support the interests of the commercial farmers and hydropower plants downstream. The 
Pangani and Rufiji basins were particularly designated for hydropower production and a special 
ordinance was prepared to protect such interest. In 1923, the British put in place the first Water 
(Utilization and Control) Act. Water users were required to acquire water rights, which were mainly 
issued to white commercial farmers who had settled along the mid-reaches of Tanzania highlands. In 
the Pangani basin the commercial farmers settled on the slopes of Mount Meru and Mount Kilimanjaro 
forming what Spear (1997) called the 'iron ring' of land alienation. The Africans ('natives') were however 
allowed to develop a separate water allocation system building on local customs and traditions. The 
British created crown lands to be governed by statutory law and native reserves (land occupied by the 
Africans) to be governed by local law (Komakech et al., 2012a). This marked the beginning of a plural 
system of water governance in Tanzania’s river basins. Local users have developed separate water-
sharing arrangements at the level of an irrigation canal (between irrigated plots), between nearby 
irrigation canals along a river within one village, and between distant villages sharing a river (Komakech 
et al., 2011). 
The 1923 water act was subsequently amended by the colonial government in 1948 and 1959. The 
British declared absolute authority over water resources in the territory and introduced (nominal) 
water right application fees. In 1959, options of registration were extended to all water users including 
the Africans. National water officers were authorised to allocate and charge water right fees. These 
functions were delegated to regional offices. However, the British also put more emphasis on improving 
irrigation efficiency of farmer-initiated irrigation canals, which were believed to be wasteful. 
The independent government of Tanzania later continued with the colonial policy of regulatory 
water allocation and management. All water resources were declared vested in the United Republic of 
Tanzania under the 1974 Water Utilization (Control and Regulation) Act. In later amendments the 
country was zoned into nine basins and Basin Water Boards were created to allocate and manage water 
resources. Under the influence of foreign donors, enforcing water rights became a mechanism for 
taxation. The World Bank particularly argued that rational water use could only be achieved through 
increasing economic water use fees. Low tariffs were stated to contribute to inefficient water use 
(World Bank, 1996). 
Irrigation improvement was recommended, since improved irrigation efficiency would release water 
from the agriculture sector to be used by highest-value uses whichin the case of Pangani and Rufiji 
basins, are hydropower plants located downstream. To support this point, the World Bank (1996) 
estimated the value of water in traditional irrigation at US$ cents 0.5 per m3 of water and in improved 
irrigation schemes at US$ cents 3.0 per m3 of water. 
Following the recommendation of a rapid water resources assessment by the World Bank (1996), 
Tanzania embarked on a legal reform of the water sector with emphasis on regulatory water use. To 
regulate water use gates were constructed on irrigation canals abstracting water from major tributaries 
of the Pangani river. However, many gates were destroyed by farmers who did not agree with the 
state-led water right system. A revised National Water Policy was put in place in 2002 and passed into 
law by the Water Act of 2009. The policy embraces the principles of IWRM with the major goal of 
attaining equitable and sustainable management of the water resources. All water users are required to 
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register and obtain permits indicating the purpose of use and the annual volume of water the users are 
entitled to. The permit holder must pay an annual water use fees calculated according to volume 
allocated and purpose of water use. 
Current state-led water allocation and management in the Pangani basin are the responsibility of the 
PBWB. In accordance with the provision of the Water Utilization (Control and Regulation) Act of 1974 
and its amendments of 1981, 1989, 1997, and 2009, an individual user, city authority or institution must 
apply for a water use permit. Officially, all rights applications are to be gazetted in a government 
newspaper for at least 40 days, during which all affected users have to be consulted and local district 
authorities must submit reports on the status of the water source. This includes recommendations from 
the District Agricultural and Livestock Development Officer, Regional Water Engineer, District 
Administrative Secretary, and District Executive Director. For large projects, clearance certificates of 
environmental impact assessment must be acquired from the National Environment Management 
Council. The PBWO also conducts studies on water availability. Based on the district department heads’ 
recommendations and the water supply assessment report, the PBWB decides to grant or reject a 
water right application. In general, the application process can take months to years before a water 
right is granted (the PBWB only meets once every 3 months). Projects of national interest, e.g. water 
right applications for cities are, however, often expedited. 
Moshi Urban Water Supply Authority vs. Shiri Njoro village farmers 
In addition to three other sources (combined capacity 13,850 m3/day), Moshi Urban Water Supply 
Authority (MUWSA) also obtains water from Shiri spring (10,150 m3/day). Shiri spring is located about 7 
km from Moshi town on the way to Arusha in the village of Shiri Njoro, Hai district (figure 3). 
The spring feeds the Kiladeda river and forms parts of the river network originating from the slope of 
Mt. Kilimanjaro flowing into the Pangani river. MUWSA is the biggest water user but farmers from Shiri 
Njoro village rely on the spring for small-scale irrigation, and domestic and livestock needs. Farmers 
have constructed three irrigation canals (Kitifu Mashariki, Kitifu Kati, and Kitifu Magharibi) which they 
use to irrigate yams, bananas, maize, coffee and vegetables. 
PBWB has so far issued six volumetric water use rights on Shiri spring (collective and individual): 
MUWSA 116 l/s; chairman Kitifu Mashariki 30 l/s; chairman Kitifu Kati 30 l/s; chairman Kitifu Magharibi 
30 l/s; Elisa G Mallya 1 l/s; and J.P. Muro 1 l/s. The total allocated abstraction of the spring flow is thus 
208 l/s, and the PBWB estimated the average yield of the spring at 218 l/s, so about 10 l/s is left to flow 
into the Kiladeda river. 
Historical evolution of Moshi city control of Shiri spring 
In the 1950s, farmers established the three canals drawing from the Shiri spring for supplemental 
irrigation during rainy seasons and full irrigation in the dry seasons. To construct the canals, farmers 
sought permission from the area chief. About the same time the British colonial administration also 
constructed a water supply line (10 inch pipe with abstracting about 56 l/s) for Moshi town on the same 
source. Moshi town’s intake was located upstream of the existing Shiri Njoro village canals. According 
to the farmers there was no water conflict but once in a while they would experience water shortages. 
In 1994, MUWSA applied for an additional allocation of 68 l/s from Shiri spring and was granted 60 
l/s by the PBWB. The new allocation thus increased total water right of MUSA on Shiri spring to 116 l/s. 
The Regional Water Engineer of Kilimanjaro informed the Shiri Njoro village chairman about the 
additional allocation. The chairman however responded by highlighting water shortage in the village 
and stated that during a village meeting farmers objected to the additional water allocation to MUWSA. 
Several communications, meetings and confrontations have since taken place and still continued when 
fieldwork was conducted. No solution has been found according to the chairman of the village canal 
association. The village canal association kept records of all meetings, letters, water conflict events and 
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reports related to the spring water conflict. We were provided access to these records by the secretary 
of Shiri Njoro village canal association. Shiri farmers are now looking for a lawyer to argue the case in 
court. Box 1 presents a review of the evolution of water conflict in the Shiri spring. 
Figure 3. The Kiladeda river sub-catchment, springs, furrow intakes and location of Moshi town. 
 
Summary of Shiri spring water conflict 
Shiri spring is a small water source but the issuing of water rights has not led to orderly use or even 
increased efficiency. The Shiri spring case highlights the challenges of administering a formal water right 
system in the Pangani river basin. The smallholder farmers are willing to jointly manage and allocate the 
waters of Shiri Njoro. MUWSA has been uncooperative and PBWO has been unable to resolve the 
emerging conflict. The spring flow is over-allocated. Fixed volumetric water rights were issued based on 
the assumption of a constant spring yield of 218 l/s. However, recent field measurements by PBWO 
indicate that the spring yield is frequently much lower. MUWSA continues to abstract over and above 
its allocated share including during periods of low flow, leaving the villages with about half their 
formally allocated right. MUWSA technical manager states that since the government gives first priority 
to domestic water use, the city does not feel obliged to reduce its share when the spring yield 
decreases. When asked if they could compensate the farmers for the lost income, the manager said 
that the city already does that by paying the annual water user fee to the PBWB. The case also shows 
that the water scarcity created by Moshi city causes internal water struggles between irrigators. 
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The following section presents a similar water conflict in the Nduruma sub-catchment. Unlike Shiri 
spring, Nduruma water is used by both smallholder and large-scale commercial farmers. 
Box 1. Evolution of Shiri spring water conflict (Source: based on Shiri Njoro farmers file). 
1994 Kilimanjaro Regional Water Engineer informs Shiri Njoro village about the new water project of 
MUWSA. The villagers responded that additional abstraction by MUWSA will aggravate water 
shortages in the village.  
1998 Farmers create the Shiri Njoro canal association and write to MUWSA that the new project will 
affect the 411 households dependent on the water for domestic use and irrigation. The farmers 
apply for a formal water right for the entire spring water (300 l/s) but the PBWB allocates the 
three canals 30 l/s each. 
1999 The village canal association petitions the Director of Development of Hai district about the 
additional allocation to MUWSA. Lyamungo Division Secretary writes to MUWSA advising the 
authority to dialogue with the village. 
2000 The Regional Water Engineer holds several meetings with the village and MUWSA. The PBWO 
clarifies that MUWSA will take 116 l/s and that with a spring yield of 300 l/s there will be 
sufficient water for the canals. PBWO directs MUWSA to provide domestic water through 
standpipes to the village. 
When MUWSA fails to abide by the agreement, the farmers petition the Kilimanjaro Regional 
Commissioner, who calls for proper research on water availability. PBWO finds that the spring 
yield was 218 l/s, total abstraction 209 l/s, leaving 9 l/s as inflow to Kiladeda. 
2001 The village Executive Officer of Shiri Njoro complains to the regional water engineer of 
Kilimanjaro that MUWSA now abstracts all the water from the spring and uses two pipelines. He 
states that the villages are preparing to destroy the MUWSA pipelines. 
The Regional Water Engineer states that field measurement carried out in March (start of the 
rainy season) found that the available water at the spring had reduced from 218 to 181 l/s. The 
District Commissioner tells MUWSA to remove the old pipeline. 
MUWSA refuses to ration water and continues to abstract more than allocated, arguing that 
since domestic water takes priority, it is up to the village farmers to reduce their use. 
2002 The District Commissioner contacts the Kilimanjaro Regional Commissioner, stating that the 
main problem was that the new MUWSA pipeline takes 127 l/s and that only the first canal 
(Kitifu Magharibi) receives water. Downstream farmers react by destroying the intake of the 
first canal. The PBWO intervenes and tells the farmers to rebuild the canal intake.  
2003 MUWSA continues to abstract more water than allocated. The village farmers refuse to pay the 
annual water fees. 
2004 The village canal association chairman writes to the PBWO, complaining that the three village 
canals have failed to get their allocated 30 l/s per canal and that cash crops have dried up. 
2007 The Shiri Village Executive Officer writes to the PBWO complaining of over-abstraction by two 
individual farmers, Elisa Mallya and Lt. Col. Muro. The farmers invade their homes, destroying 
water infrastructures. 
The PBWO conducts flow measurements and finds that MUWSA abstracts 120 l/s; the first canal 
(Kitifu Magharibi) 17 l/s; the second canal (Kitifu Kati) 13 l/s and the third (Kitifu Mashariki) 15 
l/s. Mallya and Muro abstract no water because their intakes are destroyed. PBWO warns that 
damaging the infrastructure of other users is against the Water Act of 1974 section 33(2). 
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Arusha Urban Water Supply Authority vs. Nduruma water users 
Nduruma river crosses eight administrative wards of Arumeru district, with its headwaters located 
within a protected forest reserve on the slopes of Mount Meru (figure 4). 
The highlands are occupied by smallholder farmers who maintain irrigation canals and grow crops 
like beans, coffee, bananas and potatoes. The midlands are the most intensively farmed along the 
Nduruma river. Here the majority of the farmers have large commercial estates (mostly foreign-owned), 
first created by the colonial government (Spear, 1997) and later privatised in the 1990s. Crops grown 
include coffee, flowers, horticultural crops, fruits, bananas, maize and beans. The lowlands were 
recently settled by people escaping land shortage in the highlands and former estate workers. The first 
group of immigrants moved into the area during the colonial period and a second group arrived in the 
1970s mainly stimulated by the national government’s village resettlement programme. The inhabitants 
came from different groups and most are smallholder farmers. Crops grown include maize, beans, 
banana, cassava, pigeon peas and horticultural crops. Also a significant number of freely grazing 
livestock are kept. This zone experiences extreme water shortages during the dry seasons. 
Figure 4. Nduruma sub-catchment, irrigation intakes and villages. 
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Irrigation along the Nduruma river has been practised for over 200 years (Spear, 1997). Nevertheless, 
agricultural intensification started during the colonial period when commercial farmers (Germans, 
Greeks and British) settled in the area. At the end of colonial rule, the majority of the irrigation canals in 
the Nduruma highlands belonged to Africans, the midlands to Europeans and the lowlands to Africans 
(Komakech et al., 2012a). The situation is nearly the same today. The Nduruma river is over-committed 
to agriculture such that it now only flows for part of the year (figure 5). The estates were first issued 
water rights during colonial times. These were later reviewed by PBWO in the 1990s. 
However, with the increasing population of Arusha city and the booming tourism and mining 
industries the water demand of the city is on the rise (Komakech and van der Zaag, 2011). The city 
therefore was forced to look for water from the surrounding rivers, including Nduruma. Here, Arusha 
city built an intake located upstream of all the existing water users (figure 5). For farmers, the arrival of 
the Arusha city water authority could only exacerbate the competition over scarce water. 
Historical evolution of Arusha city water control in the Nduruma catchment 
The struggles over land and water access in the Nduruma sub-catchment started during colonial times 
when local farmers were dispossessed of their lands and water resources (Spear, 1997; Komakech et al., 
2012a). The commercial estates were issued water use permits while Africans were allowed to use 
water according to their customary arrangements. In 1968, the commercial estates formed the 
Nduruma Water User Association to strengthen their negotiation position. However, around the same 
time the government started its resettlement programme (the villagisation programme). Most of the 
coffee estates collapsed and have only recently been revitalised. Since its creation the Nduruma water 
user association has never really functioned and is not known to the PBWB or to the district authorities. 
However, a river committee has been created by the farmers to oversee the water allocation 
between the midland and lowland farmers (Komakech et al., 2012a). This river committee attempts to 
reduce water use by the estates from 24 hours, as stipulated in the state-issued water right, to 6-9 
hours per day. The weakness of the Nduruma river committee is that its membership excludes highland 
users and only encompasses commercial estates and the downstream small-scale irrigators. The 
committee members are in effect distributing amongst themselves the water that the highland villages 
were unable to use (Komakech et al., 2012a). The river committee leaders explained that they lack the 
power to reach out to the representatives of the upstream users. This is because the upstream villages 
have water allocation arrangements that lack formal structures for downstream villages to engage with. 
The highland irrigation canals have a committee which is responsible only for maintenance and 
allocation of water to individual farmers (Komakech et al., 2012a). Representatives from two midland 
estates (Dekker Bruins and Tanzania Flowers) confirmed that on their own it is not possible to discuss 
water-related issues with upstream users; they need the district office to act as an intermediary. They 
also explained that even when the district office intervenes their influence only lasts about a week, 
after which upstream users stop cooperating. 
In 2001, the PBWB granted AUWSA a 55 l/s water use right on the Nduruma river to supplement the 
city’s growing domestic water needs. AUWSA gets most of its water supply from springs, boreholes and 
river sources located within the Themi sub-catchment (Komakech and van der Zaag, 2011). The 
Nduruma permit gave priority of allocation to Arusha city which is located 40 km outside the Nduruma 
sub-catchment. It also allowed the city to construct its pipe intake upstream of existing users, creating a 
locational advantage that coincides with the priority status of the permit. Existing users were not 
involved or consulted in the issuance of this water right as stipulated in the water act. In 2003, AUWSA 
started constructing the Nduruma water pipeline, but conflicts between AUWSA and the various 
downstream users soon erupted. This included a violent riot in October of that year which temporarily 
put the AUWSA project on hold. 
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Figure 5. Flow diagram of the Nduruma river, showing water abstractions and inflows as measured by 
PBWO in November 2003 (dry season). 
 
Source: Komakech et al., 2012a; as groundwater inflow was not accurately determined, values do not add up. 
Against the threat of this new pipeline, all midland and lowland users – villagers and estates alike – 
found themselves momentarily on the same side. The Gomba Estate manager (Mr. Michael Chamber) 
knew that Arusha city would reduce his water supply in the dry season, when he needed it most, far 
below the flow levels stated in his water right. He petitioned the district commissioner on the new 
allocation to Arusha city and when the district commissioner refused to respond to his complaints, 
Chamber decided to engage with the villagers. According to Chamber, he discovered that there was an 
inactive Water Users Association (WUA) that had been founded in 1968 but not registered with PBWO. 
He thought that if this extinct WUA were legally recognised it could add potency to his arguments 
against the pipeline construction. He helped revive the Nduruma WUA with Mr. William Nassari of the 
downstream Nduruma Village acting as chairman, and Michael Chamber serving as secretary. The 
District Irrigation Office interprets these events as Gomba Estate using the downstream smallholder 
farmers to protest against AUWSA. He claims that Chamber even hired trucks to transport the angry 
villagers up Mount Meru to the source of the Nduruma, were they began to riot. A publicity campaign 
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was later launched by AUWSA in an attempt to sensitise the downstream users about the importance 
of Arusha’s domestic water project. Security was increased at the water abstraction site, including the 
construction of a permanent police station to monitor the area. PBWO and the district authority 
organised meetings in each ward and the villagers were strongly dissuaded from continuing to 
participate in 'Chamber’s WUA'. The reconstituted WUA meetings have since stopped and there has 
been no effort to revive it since 2004 when the AUWSA pipeline became operational, and downstream 
users try to cope with increased water shortages, especially during the dry seasons. Box 2 presents the 
historical evolution of the conflict between AUWSA and Nduruma water users. 
More recently, in 2011, PBWB and its development partners (International Union for Conservation 
(IUCN), Pamoja Trust and Stichting Nederlandse Vrijwilligers (SNV Netherlands Development 
Organisation) created a separate Nduruma river committee that is supposed to link all the water users 
in the sub-catchment (Komakech and van der Zaag, forthcoming). However, the new Nduruma 
committee has not been operational as yet, as the upstream farmers remain unwilling to cooperate 
with the downstream users. 
Box 2. Evolution of AUWSA versus Nduruma farmers’ water conflict. 
2001 PBWB issues a water permit to AUWSA to abstract 55 l/s of water from the Nduruma river. The 
local farmers and estates, having state-issued water rights, are not informed. 
2003 AUWSA starts constructing a pipeline at the source of the Nduruma river. In October 2003, 
farmers attack the contractor employed by AUWSA, his car and 300 culverts are destroyed. 
Construction is stalled. 
Commercial farmers with water rights issued by PBWO get involved. The Gomba estate 
managing director sends a letter of objection to PBWO, highlighting the importance of 
Nduruma to Tanzania’s largest flower, fresh vegetables, and horticultural farms. He argues that 
water availability in Nduruma is at a point where an upstream user cannot access his or her full 
water right without affecting the allocated rights of other users downstream. The letter is 
copied to the President of Tanzania and the Ministers of Finance, Agriculture and Food 
Security, and Water and Livestock Development. 
The chairman of the reconstituted Nduruma Water User Association appeals to the Minister of 
Water and Livestock Development, stating that contrary to the Water Utilization Act of 1974, 
they were not informed of the AUWSA water project. 
The Principal Water Officer, Ministry of Water and Livestock Development, urges PBWO to 
conduct a water assessment and to encourage dialogue between the users. The Basin Water 
Officer meanwhile responds to the Gomba estate’s director that he will review all existing 
water rights and ajust all right holders as the available water is inadequate to satisfy all rights. 
PBWO conducts a (new) water assessment and through an extraordinary PBWB meeting 
reduces all water permits by 20% and all permits are declared provisional rather than 
permanent. AUWSA is allocated 44 l/s but permitted to increase its use to 55 l/s during the 
rainy season. 
2004 IUCN and Pamoja (a local NGO), through a 'dialogue on water project', try to get involved but 
are unsuccessful in mediating the water conflict. 
2006 Gomba estate closes down partly due to lack of water security. Its property is sold to Arusha 
Municipal council, who intends to establish a satellite township. AUWSA completes its water 
project. The site is guarded by a private security company and locals are denied entry to the 
forest without security escorts. 
2009 Young farmers from Bangata and Nkoanrua villages attack the AUWSA abstraction point with 
machetes. 
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Summary of the Nduruma river water conflict 
Like Shiri Njoro farmers, existing water users in Nduruma were not consulted or compensated. To this 
day, farmers remain dissatisfied with the situation. They claim that AUWSA abstracts far more water 
than their nominal allocation and that AUWSA does not respond with any sympathy to the farmers’ 
complaints of scarcity in the dry season. Their position is also shared by the Arumeru district executive 
director. According to the director it is unfair for AUWSA to tap Nduruma water without making any 
contribution to the villagers using the same water source. The director argues that AUWSA earns a 
hefty income from Nduruma water so it would be fair to pay royalties to villagers for the management 
and protection of the water resources. The AUWSA managing director, in contrast, claims that since 
water resources in Tanzania are government property it is the responsibility of the government to 
decide how best it is used. Occasionally the frustration of the villagers is manifested in violent ways. In 
January 2009, a band of young farmers from Bangata and Nkoanrua villages attacked the AUWSA 
abstraction point with machetes. Interestingly, in 2003 the PBWO revised all water rights downwards 
by 20%, and further made the water right of the city flexible: AUWSA was allowed to increase its use to 
the originally allocated 55 l/s during the rainy seasons only. Farmers interviewed from the villages of 
Mako Loita, Bangata, Midawe, Mlangarini, and Nduruma all stated that they would like PBWO to 
institute a system that obliges AUWSA to reduce its allocation during the dry season. 
The people affected most by AUWSA water use are farmers using the nearest three irrigation canals, 
i.e. Nicodemu, Mako Loita and Nkoanrua. Downstream of these irrigation canals there are more springs 
and streams joining the river. Midland and lowland farmers have initiated a rotational allocation system 
(domestic and livestock uses inclusive) that is negotiated on a seasonal basis (Komakech et al., 2012a). 
Although commercial estates and smallholder farmers tried to create a front by reconstituting the 1968 
Nduruma Water User Association, they were not able to stop AUWSA from taking control of Nduruma 
water. AUWSA was the last user to arrive in Nduruma but has now the first call on the water. Water use 
by Arusha has had negative local socio-economic consequences: one estate (Gomba) closed down and 
many villagers lost temporary or permanent employment opportunities. 
DISCUSSION 
Water distribution in Pangani is characterised by local investments in water infrastructure and local 
distribution rules that evolved over time. These infrastructures and customary allocation rules take 
water variability into consideration. In many places, irrigation areas expand and contract in sync with 
water availability and the allocation rules also change with the seasons (dry and wet seasons). In the 
nearby Themi river, for example, water is reserved for domestic and livestock use during certain periods 
of the dry season (Komakech and van der Zaag, 2011), while in Makanya catchment downstream 
farmers are encouraged to borrow land in the upstream parts of the irrigation command areas during 
dry seasons (Komakech et al., 2012b). Lankford and Beale (2007) found a similar arrangement in the 
Usangu basin, also in Tanzania, and report that 20% of the maximum area could always be irrigated and 
that the maximum area can only be served during exceptionally wet years. 
Both case histories presented in this paper show the existence of a hybrid, plural legal situation: 
prior customary uses co-exist, and sometimes clash, with formal government laws first initiated by the 
colonial administration and later revived by the independent government of Tanzania. Officially, the 
Pangani Basin Water Board and Office is responsible for the allocation of water use rights and 
management of water resources of the basin. 
The PBWO relies on reports and assessment studies to allocate water rights, but does not monitor 
actual water use. The board’s staff only moves around to collect the annual water user fees. In many 
places, water abstraction exceeds the allocated amount and the increased use of mobile water pumps 
by dispersed smallholder farmers particularly renders the water administration system ineffective. We 
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observed a complex water-sharing arrangement, especially in coffee estates on the slopes of Mount 
Kilimanjaro. These estates were originally managed by rural cooperative societies, which have now 
leased their estates to private investors with the mandate to grow coffee. However, these investors are 
also subletting the farms to other private investors who mostly grow high-value crops: flowers, 
tomatoes and green beans for international markets that incidentally also require to be irrigated. The 
complex arrangements mean that those private investors without water rights collaborate with those 
with water rights to abstract more water. PBWO does not have the means of verifying the water use by 
the estates. An interviewed officer of PBWO said that "if there is no problem, you do not need to 
disturb the equilibrium or the flow of the system. It is difficult for us as PBWO to check all water use; we 
only get involved when there is conflict". 
Cities acquire their water rights from PBWO. The smallholder farmers use their prior customary uses 
and governance arrangements to claim access right, while cities use formal law (particularly priority 
allocation to domestic uses) to gain control of water. The smallholder farmers are officially obliged to 
apply for formal water rights as well, but in practice only some irrigators with individual canals and 
pumps have done so, but none of the furrow irrigators. This may possibly be explained by the fact that 
the latter are not as administration-savvy compared to cities and commercial farmers or that they find 
the statutory system lacks legitimacy. Although smallholder farmers were the first to start using the 
water sources, they are increasingly being made the last by PBWO which gives allocation priority to 
cities. 
Water transfers to cities in the Pangani river basin may be categorised as permanent and outright (cf. 
Molle and Berkoff, 2009). The mechanism used to reallocate water to the city of Arusha and Moshi 
followed a combination of administrative decision and stealth. The formal water law requires that 
before issuing a water use right, all potentially affected parties be consulted and existing or potential 
water conflicts should be resolved before any new allocation can be made (URT, 2009). In both Shiri 
spring and Nduruma, farmers were not properly consulted by the basin water board/office. Farmers 
using Shiri spring and Nduruma both contested the appropriation (e.g. by rioting, by involving various 
department heads and political leaders), but they were not able to stop the powerful city water 
authorities from gaining control of the water. 
The two case studies highlight aspects not often mentioned in the literature on inter-sectoral water 
transfers. First, unlike other cases (see Loeve et al., 2004; Bhattarai et al., 2005; Hearne, 2007; Celio et 
al., 2010), Pangani is a basin where 80% of the users are smallholder farmers who have invested 
significant time and labour in the construction and maintenance of irrigation canals. In such a setting 
reallocation to cities does not only deprive farmers of water but may also render their long-term 
hydraulic property investment (partly) obsolete. Smallholder farmers rely on the irrigation canals to 
mitigate the impact of agricultural drought, and realise their food security. In addition, these canals 
serve other purposes as well, including livestock watering, construction (brick-making) and, importantly, 
domestic uses. This domestic use is often overlooked, yet should also be accorded priority. Further, it 
could be noted that furrow water use is fully consistent with the government policy that aims at 
eliminating rural poverty. 
Second, the water policy and act give priority to registered domestic water uses and cities and only 
state that the other uses will be allocated taking into consideration the economic and social values. In 
the Pangani, cities are given first priority and the other users get a proportional reduction in the 
allocation (illustrated in the Nduruma case where the basin board reduced all existing allocation by 
20%). There are no planned measures for unregistered uses and registration does not change the 
priority allocation of the furrow. Although the new water act recognises customary water users and 
obliges them to formally register their use, it does not have a mechanism for compensation for lost 
livelihood in case the water is reallocated to new users (URT, 2009). This in a way explains why the 
smallholder farmers do not bother to register. In our view, the recognition of customary uses should be 
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grounds for compensation in case existing uses are impaired. This would create incentives for any 
newcomers to look for alternatives before appropriating water from existing users. 
Third, the current water right licensing system does not match the basin reality. It is a system that 
allocates fixed water use rights on the assumption that an average level of supply exists. However, 
water supply in the Tanzania river basins is highly variable due to unpredictability of rainfall and 
recurrence of droughts and floods (see Lankford and Beale, 2007). In such a situation, and in the 
absence of water storage infrastructure, it is the low flows during the dry seasons that pose allocation 
challenges. The water act makes a provision for the revision of water use permits in any specified area 
where the available water is insufficient to satisfy all permits. But the process does not work fast 
enough especially for dry-season scarcity. Formal water rights could benefit from local water allocation 
systems (cf. Horst, 1998). In Pangani, local farmers have developed flexible water allocation rules, 
schedules or abstraction turns that are renegotiated on a seasonal basis within the area served by 
irrigation canals and also among intakes along the river (Komakech et al., 2012b). Lankford and 
Mwaruvanda (2007) propose one such framework: a legal-infrastructure framework that integrates 
formal water rights and customary agreements by establishing a wet-season volumetric cap and a dry-
season proportional cap for all allocations. The decision to award AUWSA a water right that may 
increase during the wet season by 20% may be seen as a first step in this direction. Negotiated water 
allocation is driven not only by economic power but also by other values, including social values and 
interests, which are allowed to be heard in the negotiation process (see Molle, 2004 for a discussion on 
negotiated water allocation). Given the context of water use development and variability in the basin, 
negotiated water allocation can potentially mitigate water conflicts and reduce potential downstream 
impacts. 
Finally, given the power inequality between the city authorities and smallholder farmers, the 
capacity of the PBWO to set, monitor and enforce fair water allocation rules is very important. In the 
Pangani basin, the capacity (technical and financial) to enforce and monitor compliance with water 
allocation rules is still weak. City water authorities exploit this gap and abstract more than they are 
allocated but go unpunished. In both Nduruma and Shiri spring, the rural-to-city water transfers have 
had significant downstream impacts. Shiri farmers claim to have lost entire coffee plantations and fish 
ponds and that conflicts over water among farmers has increased. Three irrigation canals in Nduruma – 
Nicodemu, Mako Loita and Nkoanrua – despite being among the oldest users do not receive sufficient 
water most of the time. Gomba estate, that was very vocal and outright in objecting against the 
allocation to Arusha city, collapsed. The impact of this water appropriation, however, 
disproportionately affects the smallholder farmers. While the large commercial farmers can leave with 
some of their investments and look for alternatives, the smallholder farmers lose all their investments 
with much fewer alternatives and are forced to rely on marginal rain-fed agriculture, or have to join the 
peri-urban poor. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This paper described and analysed appropriation of water from smallholder irrigators by cities in a river 
basin that is becoming water-stressed. In such a stressed river basin there is a need for the state-based 
water rights allocation system to have legitimacy. However, in practice the rights system as 
administered by many governments may in fact provide the legal means for some actors to dispossess 
existing users. Powerful cities discussed in this paper selectively use the law to gain leverage over water 
control. 
In general, water appropriation and transfer to growing cities in the Pangani basin and other basins 
in sub-Saharan Africa is an ongoing process (Gupta and van der Zaag, 2008). These transfers take place 
in a context where prior investments (infrastructure and institution) have been made by smallholder 
farmers. This is in contrast to situations where the state has invested heavily in hydraulic infrastructures 
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(e.g. in storage, conveyance) and where there is a strong institutional capacity and where prior uses are 
recognised. 
Water reallocation to the cities of Arusha and Moshi was achieved through a combination of 
administrative decision and stealth. The justification was that domestic water use has the highest 
priority as stipulated in the water policy and law. However, in issuing priority rights to these cities, the 
domestic needs of the smallholders were not considered, let alone the fact that the farmers rely on the 
irrigation canals to realise their food security and livelihoods. 
Water capture of rapidly expanding cities seems inevitable. It is therefore essential that suitable 
options for water allocation be applied to minimise the potential negative impacts of the agriculture-to-
city water transfers or water allocation in general. We propose the following for Pangani, but this may 
also be applicable to other basins in semiarid areas particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. First, the state-
administered water rights system could incorporate a proportional allocation system that comes into 
operation during periods of water scarcity (see van der Zaag and Röling, 1996; Horst, 1998). By 
proportional allocation we mean a situation whereby the state-issued water right entitlements are 
reduced in proportion to the expected/observed shortfall in river flow. This could be negotiated by the 
users at the river level – for instance in Nduruma the river committee currently negotiates rotational 
allocation between smallholder farmers and estates, the latter having state-based water rights. 
Presently, the Tanzania water right system is based on average flows, without recognising the normal 
flow variability (in the absence of storage reservoirs which could buffer such fluctuations). Formal water 
rights could benefit from the time-tested local water allocation system that does take variability into 
account (Komakech and van der Zaag, 2011), and from the suggestions made by Lankford and 
Mwaruvanda (2007) and Lankford and Beale (2007) on a legal-infrastructure framework. 
Second, the PBWO capacity (technical and financial) to enforce and monitor compliance with the 
state water allocation rules is weak. Currently the basin water board does not monitor water allocation; 
it only gets involved in cases of conflict. This may explain why the water authorities in both cities 
continue to over-abstract water, leaving little to smallholder farmers. The institutional capacity to 
monitor and enforce agreements has thus to be strengthened. This could be done by recognising local 
arrangements (e.g. river committees active in Nduruma and Kiladeda rivers) and make them 
responsible for the negotiation of water allocation (Komakech and van der Zaag, 2011). It also means 
that any water transfers or allocations to cities would be negotiated by these river committees. The 
PBWO would then focus on backstopping with technical information. 
Finally, when there is good knowledge of the water resource, it may be possible to introduce a 
system of water trade or payment for lost benefits in the form of lease or option contracts that would 
only come into operation in times of scarcity (see Howitt, 1998; Characklis et al., 2006). In the Pangani, 
smallholder farmers are not being compensated when their water is appropriated by cities. Since the 
water law does recognise customary uses, allows water trade and also allows the basin water board to 
attach any condition to a use permit (including compensation to any other person), it is theoretically 
possible to institutionalise a compensation scheme that recognises the prior water use and farmers’ 
investments in water infrastructure. This could be grounds for compensation of smallholder farmers 
and may create incentives for newcomers to look for alternative water sources, invest in additional 
storage options or invest in demand management and leakage control. In so doing the first would not 
have to become the last. 
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